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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal stems from a dispute over the sale of ready-
mix concrete in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Appellant Spartan 
Concrete Products, LLC, which operated on St. Croix, sought 
to displace a company called Heavy Materials as the sole 
provider of ready-mix concrete on St. Thomas. Upon entering 
the St. Thomas market, Spartan started a price war with Heavy 
Materials that caused financial losses to Spartan while Heavy 
Materials retained its dominant position. After three years of 
fierce competition, the companies reached a truce by which 
they went their separate ways with Spartan agreeing to sell on 
St. Croix while Heavy Materials would keep selling on St. 
Thomas.  
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Following the truce, Spartan brought this lawsuit 
against Appellee Argos USVI, Corp., a bulk cement vendor. 
The crux of Spartan’s case is that Argos, which supplied the 
cement necessary to make the ready-mix concrete, violated 
§ 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), by 
giving Heavy Materials a 10 percent volume discount during 
the price war. Spartan claimed Argos caused its losses and 
eventual departure from St. Thomas by offering the discount to 
Heavy Materials alone. The District Court disagreed and, 
following a bench trial, entered judgment for Argos because 
Spartan failed to prove it suffered antitrust injury. The Court 
also denied Spartan leave to amend its complaint to include 
two tort claims, finding undue delay and prejudice. Because 
Spartan failed to establish antitrust injury, and the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, 
we will affirm both orders.  
I 
The relevant facts begin in 2010, when Spartan 
expanded its ready-mix concrete sales from St. Croix to St. 
Thomas and St. John. For the next three years, Spartan 
competed fiercely with Heavy Materials—the only other seller 
of ready-mix concrete on St. Thomas.  
Argos was the only vendor of bulk cement on St. 
Thomas during this period of competition between Spartan and 
Heavy Materials. Argos sold cement to both companies, but 
gave Heavy Materials—which accounted for, on average, 77 
to 80 percent of Argos’s bulk sales between 2010 and 2013—
a 10 percent volume discount. Spartan claims that this discount 
gave Heavy Materials such a competitive advantage on St. 
Thomas that Spartan had to cease operations there.  
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 Spartan frequently reduced its prices to compete with 
Heavy Materials, which precipitated a price war between the 
two companies. As a result, Spartan’s market share on St. 
Thomas rose to nearly 30 percent by the end of 2011. Spartan’s 
former minority owner and operations manager, Rodgers 
Bressi, testified that Spartan started the price war with the goal 
of obtaining a monopoly on St. Thomas and/or St. Croix. 
Warren Mosler, Spartan’s majority owner, planned for Spartan 
to incur short-term harm during the price war and “eventually 
recoup its losses.” App. 633–34. Bressi also testified that 
Mosler wanted to pressure Heavy Materials to sell its business 
to Spartan. The owner of Heavy Materials, Doug Gurlea, 
testified that a pattern emerged: each time Spartan would 
broach “[t]he subject of purchasing [Heavy Materials’s] 
concrete operations” and Heavy Materials declined the 
overtures, “[t]here would be, within days, a price decrease 
that . . . Spartan would initiate.” App. 722. 
 After a few years, the price war became unsustainable, 
so Spartan and Heavy Materials struck a deal. In December 
2013, they agreed that Spartan would withdraw from St. 
Thomas and Heavy Materials would stop competing on St. 
Croix. This arrangement was memorialized in two documents: 
(1) an assignment of Spartan’s lease to Heavy Materials for a 
concrete plant on St. Thomas; and (2) a requirements supply 
agreement under which Spartan would purchase all of the 
aggregate needed to produce concrete on St. Croix from Heavy 
Materials, which in turn agreed “not to supply ready-mix 
concrete on the island of St. Croix.” App. 847. So as of 
December 2013, each company had a monopoly on one of the 
islands.  
 Spartan incurred significant losses during the price war 
with Heavy Materials. Spartan’s management consultant, 
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Michael Pede, estimated that the company’s total losses during 
its three years of operation on St. Thomas were $3,807,587.95. 
Spartan argues that Argos’s discount to Heavy Materials made 
Spartan uncompetitive on St. Thomas. During the three years 
of competition, cement costs accounted for 12.8 percent of 
Spartan’s $13.2 million in costs. Because it did not receive the 
10 percent discount given to Heavy Materials, Spartan incurred 
an additional $181,429, representing 1.4 percent of its total 
costs. Pede admitted that Spartan reduced its costs in several 
categories, such as labor, other materials, and transportation, 
by 5 percent. During the competitive period, Spartan also wrote 
off more than $345,000 in bad debts from customers.  
II 
 In January 2015, about a year after its truce with Heavy 
Materials, Spartan sued Argos for engaging in price 
discrimination in violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Spartan Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos 
USVI, Corp., 2017 WL 2462824, at *1 (D.V.I. June 7, 2017).  
Argos and Spartan appeared before Magistrate Judge 
Ruth Miller for a pretrial conference in April 2015. Judge 
Miller ordered the parties to propound written discovery by the 
end of May with initial written discovery to be completed by 
the beginning of October that same year. But over the next 
several months, the parties repeatedly missed Judge Miller’s 
deadlines for conducting initial discovery. In December 2015, 
Judge Miller ordered the parties to submit a joint proposed 
discovery schedule the next month. The parties also missed this 
deadline and did not comply until February 2016. Judge Miller 
then entered a trial management order stating in part that all 
written discovery would be responded to by the end of the 
month and fact discovery would be completed by mid-August. 
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In July, Spartan served Argos with a second request for 
production of documents. Argos objected and responded one 
month later.  
In October 2016, Spartan moved to amend its complaint 
to include two additional claims against Argos: intentional 
interference with business relations and civil conspiracy. 
Spartan asserted that Argos’s response to the second request 
for production and discovery production by non-party Heavy 
Materials showed both Argos’s intentional interference with 
Spartan’s business relations and its conspiracy with Heavy 
Materials to force Spartan out of business.  
In November 2016, a month after Spartan sought leave 
to amend, Argos also moved to amend its answer, seeking to 
add counterclaims against Spartan and individuals associated 
with Spartan for antitrust violations. It based these claims on 
deposition testimony suggesting that Spartan and Heavy 
Materials conspired to divide the ready-mix concrete market 
between St. Thomas and St. Croix.  
In February 2017, four months after its first motion to 
amend, Spartan filed a second motion to amend, seeking to add 
to the proposed amended complaint more detailed factual 
allegations about the new claims. Later that same month, Judge 
Miller issued a Report and Recommendation recommending 
denial of the parties’ motions to amend because both parties 
had exercised undue delay. Argos and Spartan filed objections 
to the R&R, which the District Court originally adopted after 
review for clear error because the District Court deemed the 
parties’ objections untimely. On reconsideration, the District 
Court, applying plenary review, yet again adopted the R&R, 
and denied both parties’ motions for leave to amend.  
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The District Court conducted a bench trial in July 2017. 
At the conclusion of Spartan’s evidence, Argos moved for a 
directed verdict.1 The District Court granted that motion and 
                                                 
1 Although both Argos and the District Court referred to 
this motion as one for a “directed verdict,” the 1991 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced 
the term “directed verdict” in Rule 50 with the term “judgment 
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) advisory committee’s 
note to 1991 amendment. A judgment as a matter of law under 
Rule 50(a) can be granted only in jury trials, however. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50(a); Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 
F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1999). Rule 52 governs motions for 
judgment made during a bench trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. Here, 
the District Court did not make the separate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a)(1). Instead, the 
Court assessed Spartan’s evidence by applying the more 
favorable Rule 50(a) standard by “assuming and giving all 
inferences in [its] favor.” App. 54. Had the District Court 
properly treated it as a Rule 52 motion, the Court would have 
“applie[d] the same standard of proof and weigh[ed] the 
evidence as it would [have] at the conclusion of the trial.” EBC, 
Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 272 (3d Cir. 2010).  
We may remand the case to the district court when it 
fails to make factual findings under Rule 52(a). See In re 
Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184, 196–97 (3d Cir. 
2013).“Where the facts are largely undisputed, however, ‘we 
need not remand if application of the correct standard could 
support only one conclusion.’” Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative 
Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 
2004)); see 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
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entered judgment in favor of Argos, finding that Spartan failed 
to provide sufficient evidence of antitrust injury and damages. 
Spartan timely appealed.  
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. Spartan appeals the District Court’s judgment in favor 
of Argos and its order denying Spartan’s motion to amend its 
                                                 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2577 (3d ed. 2008) (“The 
appellate court will determine the appeal without further 
elaboration by the trial judge if the record sufficiently informs 
it of the basis of the district court’s decision of the material 
issues in the case, or if the only contentions raised by the 
parties on appeal do not turn on findings of fact.”). Here, the 
facts are largely undisputed, as the parties focus on whether the 
evidence at trial was legally sufficient to prove antitrust injury. 
So we will review the record “to determine whether, in light of 
the controlling legal principles, the facts and/or the failures in 
the District Court’s analysis compel a result as a matter of law.” 
Sabinsa, 609 F.3d at 183; see Hsu ex rel. Hsu v. Roslyn Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 848 n.1, 852–53 (2d Cir. 
1996) (exercising plenary review of a denial of a preliminary 
injunction when the district court failed to make factual 
findings under Rule 52(a)). As a result, our review is analogous 
to an appeal of summary judgment, and we will “review the 
record as a whole and in the light most favorable to [Spartan], 
drawing reasonable inferences in its favor.” In re Chocolate 
Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 
2015). Although we choose in this instance not to remand, we 
emphasize that following the strictures of Rule 52(a) in a bench 
trial is the proper approach for a district court.  
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complaint. “We review a district court’s refusal to allow a 
plaintiff to amend [its] complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a) for abuse of discretion.” Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001). We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. 
EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 273 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
IV 
 We first consider the District Court’s judgment in favor 
of Argos based on its finding that Spartan failed to provide 
sufficient evidence that it suffered antitrust injury.  
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such 
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale . . . and where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or 
prevent competition with any person who either 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination, or with customers of either of 
them. 
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15 U.S.C. § 13(a). To prove a violation of § 2(a), the plaintiff 
must show that: (1) “sales were made to two different 
purchasers in interstate commerce”; (2) “the product sold was 
of the same grade and quality”; (3) the “defendant 
discriminated in price as between the two purchasers”; and (4) 
“the discrimination had a prohibited effect on competition.” 
Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 498 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 
2007). After establishing a prima facie case for a § 2(a) 
violation, a plaintiff must satisfy § 4 of the Clayton Act—the 
treble damages provision—to recover damages. Stelwagon 
Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys. Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1273 (3d 
Cir. 1995). To recover, the plaintiff must have proof of antitrust 
injury—“some showing of actual injury attributable to 
something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.” J. 
Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 
(1981). 
Here, the District Court found that Spartan established 
the first three elements of a § 2(a) violation: “[I]t is clear that 
the evidence has established that there were sales that were 
made by Argos to two different purchasers in interstate 
commerce[,] . . . [t]he product sold was of the same grade and 
quality[,] [a]nd there was [] some discrimination, that is, Heavy 
Materials received a ten percent discount [while] Spartan did 
not.” App. 54. And because the Court assumed Spartan 
suffered a competitive injury (the fourth element), App. 54, 
this appeal turns on whether Spartan satisfied the damages 
requirement by proving antitrust injury.  
To establish antitrust injury, “a plaintiff must prove a 
causal connection between the price discrimination and actual 
damage suffered.” Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1273. And 
“[a]lthough the proof requirements of section 4 are ‘less than 
stringent,’ there must be some direct evidence of injury to 
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support an award of damages.” Id. at 1274 (citation omitted) 
(quoting J.F. Feeser v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc, 909 F.2d 1524, 
1540 (3d Cir. 1990)). We have explained that the “relaxed 
measure of proof is afforded to the amount, not the causation 
of loss—the nexus between the defendant’s illegal activity and 
the injuries suffered must be reasonably proven.” In re Lower 
Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1176 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  
Here, the District Court assumed for the purpose of its 
analysis that competitive injury existed, but determined that 
Spartan did not produce competent evidence of a “linkage 
between . . . competitive injury and some antitrust injury that 
led to damages.” App. 54–56. The Court explained that 
Spartan’s key witness for establishing damages attributable to 
the price cut—Michael Pede—relied on assumptions about the 
business Spartan lost. When pressed for an actual measure of 
damages, Spartan “struggled” and pointed only to its view of a 
“generalized atmosphere that drove Spartan out of the 
marketplace.” App. 56. Because there was “no basis” in the 
evidence “before the Court that would allow the plaintiff to 
recover,” the District Court entered judgment in favor of 
Argos. App. 55–56.  
Spartan argues it “proved the fact of antitrust injury 
through evidence that the merciless price war caused Spartan 
to suffer continued losses and eventually to go out of business.” 
Spartan Br. 40. Spartan relies on the testimony of two 
employees (Pede and Bressi)—namely that price was an 
important factor in the jobs it received—to conclude that 
“customers chose to purchase from either Heavy Materials or 
Spartan primarily on the basis of price.” Spartan Br. 42–43. 
Spartan also notes that Heavy Materials’s manager (Kurt Nose) 
and owner (Gurlea) admitted price played a factor in the 
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market. Spartan asserts it “proved its lost sales” by presenting 
this testimony about price competitiveness, as well as by 
“showing that it competed in a two-competitor market in which 
there was an inverse relationship between Heavy Material’s 
[sic] sales and Spartan’s losses.” Id. at 46–47.  
Spartan’s arguments notwithstanding, we agree with the 
District Court that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove 
antitrust injury. Although Pede insisted Spartan lost jobs to 
Heavy Materials because of the price difference, he conceded 
that he premised his testimony on an assumption. When 
questioned about the basis of his testimony that 90 percent of 
the jobs Spartan lost were “because of the cement price 
difference,” Pede admitted he could not point to any analysis 
he performed (or otherwise) to verify that assertion. App. 623. 
He also conceded Spartan provided no “files or documents that 
would show what happened in the situations where it did not 
obtain a job” and had no “records that would show the reasons 
why customers bought from Heavy Materials rather than 
Spartan.” App. 620–21. Nor did Spartan identify or provide 
testimony from lost customers.  
In Stelwagon, we deemed inadequate expert testimony 
that “failed to sufficiently link any decline in [Plaintiff’s sales] 
to price discrimination” and noted that the plaintiff did not 
identify a single lost customer. 63 F.3d at 1275–76. We 
concluded that the plaintiff could not recover antitrust damages 
because it “failed to present any direct evidence of lost sales or 
profits caused by the discriminatory pricing.” Id. at 1276. By 
relying on testimony of employees about the importance of 
price in the market and not presenting evidence of lost 
customers, Spartan made the same errors in establishing 
antitrust injury. So the District Court did not err when it found 
that Spartan did not provide sufficient evidence for antitrust 
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damages, as Pede’s assumptions and generalized statements 
about price fall short of the requirement to show an “actual 
injury attributable to” the alleged price difference. See J. Truett 
Payne, 451 U.S. at 562. 
Furthermore, the evidence at trial showed that Spartan 
lost sales and profits for reasons unrelated to the cement 
discount. Gurlea testified that Heavy Materials won “the 
majority of the large commercial projects” based on quality 
rather than price. App. 1137–38. And Pede  acknowledged that 
Spartan lost profits because of its short-term plan of “selling 
concrete . . . at prices that were below its marginal cost.” App. 
620. Finally, Spartan lost revenue when it wrote off more than 
$345,000 in bad debts from customers. All of this evidence 
breaks the “causal connection” required for antitrust injury by 
suggesting that these factors—rather than price 
discrimination—contributed to Spartan’s lost sales and profits. 
See Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1273.  
Spartan also argues it suffered antitrust injury because 
the price war had a significant impact on its profits and 
eventually forced it to shut down. Spartan cites Pede’s 
testimony that by 2013, Spartan “had been beaten up for a very 
long time” and it “could not sustain [its] operation any longer.” 
App. 553. It further contends that “[e]limination of a business 
is the type of injury antitrust laws are intended to prevent.” 
Spartan Br. 48. Thus, Spartan concludes that it “demonstrated 
antitrust injury in fact because it proved that the brutal price 
war” “fueled by” the Argos discount to Heavy Materials 
“caused Spartan to go out of business.” Id.  
Although it is undisputed that Argos gave Heavy 
Materials alone a 10 percent volume discount on concrete, 
Spartan has presented no evidence linking this discount to its 
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inability to compete in, and its ultimate exit from, the St. 
Thomas market. Indeed, Spartan was able to compete with 
Heavy Materials for three years. And during that time, it not 
only lowered its retail prices, but also began a price war in an 
effort to drive Heavy Materials from St. Thomas. This plan 
worked for a while, as Spartan took business away from Heavy 
Materials and achieved a nearly 30 percent share of the St. 
Thomas retail ready-mix concrete market. Thus, Spartan 
cannot show antitrust injury merely by its closure on St. 
Thomas, especially because it exited the market after agreeing 
with Heavy Materials to divide the islands.  
Because Spartan did not present sufficient evidence that 
it suffered antitrust injury, the District Court did not err in 
granting judgment in favor of Argos.2  
                                                 
2 Spartan also argues the District Court erred in finding 
that it did not present sufficient evidence on the amount of its 
antitrust damages, which is a separate inquiry from 
establishing antitrust injury. It contends that because the 
venture “failed due to a market distortion caused by illegal 
price discrimination,” Spartan is entitled to recover its three 
years of operating losses from the failed venture, which total 
over $3.8 million. Spartan Br. 48. Spartan believes it deserves 
more than the going-concern value of the business because it 
“never operated in St. Thomas in a market free from illegal 
price discrimination.” Spartan Br. 50. Spartan also claims it has 
suffered a loss of $181,429 “directly attributable” to 
“overpaying for cement” from Argos when compared to the 
price paid to Argos by Heavy Materials. Spartan Br. 52. 
In our view, both measures of damages are legally 
insufficient. First, while Spartan contends its $3.8 million 
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V 
We next consider whether the District Court abused its 
discretion when it denied Spartan’s motion to amend its 
complaint to add two tort claims. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a)(2) provides a liberal standard for motions to 
amend: “The court should freely give leave when justice so 
requires.” But leave to amend may be denied when there is 
“undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and 
futility.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
                                                 
operating loss on St. Thomas was attributable to Argos’s price 
discount, Pede conceded he merely assumed that 90 percent of 
Spartan’s lost sales were attributable to the cement cost 
difference. Although Pede admitted that some sales or profits 
were lost for reasons unrelated to the discount, Spartan did not 
account for these losses in attempting to prove its damages 
claim. So this evidence does not provide a “reasonable 
estimate” of damages that is “not the product of speculation or 
guess work.” Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 
484 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Lower Lake Erie Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d at 1176). Spartan’s alternate 
argument that it should receive $181,429 in overpayment as a 
direct loss is likewise invalid. A plaintiff seeking damages 
under § 4 of the Clayton Act for a § 2(a) violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act is not entitled to “‘automatic damages’ 
in the amount of the price discrimination.” J. Truett Payne, 451 
U.S. at 561. For these reasons, the District Court did not err 
when it found that Spartan did not provide competent evidence 
to measure its damages. 
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Undue delay is “protracted and unjustified”—it “can 
place a burden on the court or counterparty” or show “a lack of 
diligence sufficient to justify a discretionary denial of leave.” 
Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017). A district 
court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend when 
the movant delays completion of discovery. See Oran v. 
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). We have also 
upheld district courts’ findings of prejudice when adding a new 
claim would “fundamentally alter[] the proceeding and could 
have been asserted earlier.” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 274.  
 The District Court denied both parties’ motions to 
amend, but only Spartan appeals. Spartan moved to add two 
tort claims—intentional interference with prospective business 
relations and civil conspiracy—based on two documents: an 
email from Argos’s General Manager explaining that the price 
reduction from Heavy Materials “must be kept confidential,” 
App. 106, and another email in which an Argos executive 
offered Heavy Materials assistance “on getting ahead with the 
bidding vs[.] Spartan,” App. 108.  
The Court agreed with Judge Miller’s R&R and found 
that the parties exhibited undue delay in completing discovery: 
“The parties simply did not conduct discovery with such 
diligence as would justify that prejudice and burden at this 
stage of the proceedings.” Spartan, 2017 WL 2462824, at *6. 
The Court detailed the delay, noting that the parties repeatedly 
failed to meet discovery deadlines. Id. at *1–4. Judge Miller 
explained that neither party sought leave to amend “until more 
than one and one-half years” after the action started and “after 
the deadline for the completion of fact discovery.” App. 19. 
The R&R recommended that the amendments should not be 
permitted because the delay would prejudice both parties, lead 
to more discovery, and place a “burden on the Court’s ability 
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to manage its caseload.” App. 20–21. The District Court 
reviewed the record de novo and agreed.3  
 Spartan argues the District Court abused its discretion 
in denying its motion to amend because there was no undue 
delay in its filing and the additional claims would not prejudice 
Argos. Both arguments are unpersuasive.  
As for undue delay, Spartan emphasizes that it filed the 
motion just ten days after Argos’s last document production (in 
which the key documents for its amendment were uncovered) 
and more than nine months before trial. Spartan also argues it 
should not be blamed for Argos’s missteps, as Argos caused 
the discovery delays and did not produce the documents 
showing the conspiracy and interference with business until 
September 2016. Because it could not have amended its 
complaint any earlier, Spartan claims the Court erred in finding 
that it was unduly dilatory. In sum, Spartan contends it “should 
not be denied leave to amend its Complaint because its 
opponent refused to play by the rules.” Spartan Br. 27.  
 Although these arguments have some superficial 
appeal, Spartan mischaracterizes the delay as one-sided. A 
thorough review of the record shows that both parties failed to 
                                                 
3 Judge Miller also concluded that Spartan’s proposed 
tort claims were futile because they “failed to plead sufficient 
facts to demonstrate its entitlement to relief.” App. 15. The 
District Court did not address this alternate ground when it 
adopted the R&R. Although Argos argues the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion because the amendments were 
futile, we need not reach this issue because, as we will explain, 
the undue delay and prejudice to Argos suffice to affirm the 
Court’s denial of leave to amend.  
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meet court-ordered deadlines and Spartan did not diligently 
seek third-party discovery despite its importance in this case. 
Judge Miller found that Spartan was equally responsible for the 
delay: “[A]lthough Spartan also relies on documents produced 
by . . . Heavy Materials to support its new claims, it does not 
appear from the record that Spartan took any action on its own 
to obtain information from Heavy Materials.” App. 20. Spartan 
also stood idle while discovery deadlines passed and did not 
move the District Court to compel compliance from Argos. In 
addressing Spartan’s conduct, the District Court explained that 
“[i]neffectually attempting to resolve disputes without court 
involvement for over a year while failing to comply with five 
of the Magistrate’s discovery orders” does not strike the 
“appropriate balance” between self-help and court 
involvement in discovery issues. Spartan, 2017 WL 2462824, 
at *6. We agree. 
 In sum, while both parties advanced plausible 
arguments about the cause of the delay and whether delay 
should impact Spartan’s motion to amend, we cannot agree that 
the District Court abused its discretion in denying Spartan’s 
motion. Spartan has not shown that the Court erroneously 
applied the law to these facts, especially considering Spartan’s 
substantial delay in pursuing discovery from Argos and Heavy 
Materials as outlined by the R&R and the District Court’s 
opinion. And the finding of undue delay, on its own, suffices 
to affirm the Court’s denial of Spartan’s motion to amend. See 
Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Moreover, the prejudice inherent in allowing leave to 
amend on this record provides another independent reason to 
affirm the District Court. Spartan argues the District Court 
abused its discretion in finding that both parties would be 
prejudiced by the proposed amendments. It contends that the 
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two causes of action it wishes to include “arise out of the same 
conduct alleged in Spartan’s original Complaint—unfair 
competition in the St. Thomas ready-mix concrete market.” 
Spartan Br. 22. Spartan also alleges Argos intentionally 
withheld the documents showing “an agreement to engage in 
illegal price discrimination.” Id. at 24. In Spartan’s view, 
Argos would suffer no prejudice, as it caused the discovery 
delay at issue.  
 Spartan’s contention that its amendments would not 
prejudice Argos is unpersuasive because the new claims would 
require additional discovery. Spartan admits that its claims are 
based on “new, previously unknown, and unsuspected facts.” 
Spartan Br. 15. And the tort claims (intentional interference 
with prospective business relations and civil conspiracy) 
involve new theories of recovery that would require different 
discovery than that related to Spartan’s original antitrust 
claims. As found by the District Court, and indicated in the 
R&R, allowing amendment to pursue these new claims would 
likely “fundamentally alter[] the proceeding and could have 
been asserted earlier.” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 274. For that 
additional reason, we hold that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying leave to amend on the basis of 
prejudice. 
 Because the District Court denied Spartan’s motion for 
leave to amend on two independently valid grounds—undue 
delay and prejudice—we will affirm the Court’s order.4 
                                                 
4 Spartan makes two other arguments about leave to 
amend on appeal. First, it contends the District Court erred in 
adopting the R&R, which found that the unduly delayed 
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 * * *  
 The District Court neither erred in entering judgment in 
favor of Argos nor abused its discretion in denying Spartan’s 
motion to amend its complaint. We will affirm both orders. 
                                                 
amendments would burden the “Court’s ability to manage its 
caseload.” App. 21. Spartan argues because the District Court 
simply “agree[d]” and did not elaborate on this purported 
burden, it abused its discretion. But the R&R appropriately 
explained the straightforward notion that a court “must balance 
the needs of all litigants in establishing and maintaining its 
schedule.” App. 21. The Court did not abuse its discretion by 
agreeing with this assessment. Second, Spartan claims the 
District Court failed to review de novo Judge Miller’s proposed 
findings and recommendations. But Spartan offers no support 
for its speculation. What’s more, the Court explicitly 
recognized its obligation to conduct a de novo review and its 
opinion reflects an independent analysis of the R&R. So both 
of these arguments fail as well.  
